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THE ROLES OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE IJC AS A POSSIBLE MODEL
L. H. Legault*

I am pleased and honored to be invited to speak to you today on the roles
of law and diplomacy in dispute resolution between Canada and the United
States. Specifically, I have been asked to address the case of the International
Joint Commission (IJC) as a possible model.
Let me make it clear from the outset that I am not a legal scholar. I appear
before you as a practitioner, speaking from something close to twenty-five
years of involvement in Canada-U.S. affairs as a negotiator and litigator, and
now as a member of the International Joint Commission. My views
inevitably reflect my background, but are entirely my own, not those of the
Commission or of any other body.
What I propose to do is to begin with a quick outline of the roles of law
and diplomacy, bringing out the chief strengths and weaknesses of each as I
see them. I shall then compare and contrast them with the special
characteristics of the UC, with a view to determining whether the
Commission offers anything uniquely helpful that could be more generally
adaptable to the resolution of transboundary problems between Canada and
the United States.
The first thing to be said about the roles of law and diplomacy - or law
and negotiation, which is the same thing - is that they are not mutually
exclusive and should not, be so considered. This does not mean that
negotiations should be constrained by narrow legalistic approaches but it
does suggest, at least, that negotiations must be within the general rules and
principles of international law. States, of course, are free to take a virtually
unlimited range of non-legal factors into account in reaching agreement: for
example, the maintenance of good relations, concessions in unrelated areas,
or other interests best determined by the parties themselves.
It is for these reasons of flexibility and control by the parties themselves
that negotiation is the generally preferred method for the resolution of
disputes between states. On the other hand, negotiation also presents serious
drawbacks. I shall focus on just three of them. First, negotiation does not
neutralize inequality of power between the parties. Second, it does not
Chairman, Canadian Section, International Joint Commission.
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provide for objective and impartial determination of the facts. Third, it does
not remove the dispute from the sphere of politics and thus, it can lead to the
adoption of extreme and intransigent positions. Political or constitutional
processes may put a settlement beyond reach or may even lead to the
reopening or rejection of an agreement after its negotiation. This latter factor
is made worse when the private interests at stake either become parties to or
virtually masters of the negotiations between governments. Think for a
moment of the recent Pacific salmon dispute between Canada and the United
States.' Unhappily, our two countries appear to share a peculiar susceptibility
to believing their own propaganda, to the point where being right can count
for more than the protection of the real interests concerned. Nothing can be
more fatal to reaching agreement.
What, then, are the advantages and disadvantages of resolving disputes
by legal proceedings? In addressing this question, I shall deal only with thirdparty settlement by arbitration or adjudication and not touch upon such other
methods as conciliation or mediation.
The advantages of third-party settlement are three-fold. First, inequality
of power becomes largely irrelevant. Second, the facts can be decided
objectively and impartially. Third, the dispute is removed from the political
sphere and even unpopular results are normally accepted.
These advantages are not all as cut-and-dried as they might appear at first
glance. Although the arbitrators or judges may consider the facts objectively
and impartially, the latter are not usually as well placed to establish, weigh,
and balance them as persons who are closer to the situation and have direct
knowledge of them. Moreover, third-party settlement is not, as a rule,
adapted to the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Nor does it
normally provide for a process of "discovery" or compulsory disclosure of
facts or documents on which a party may wish to rely. Although the
proceedings are removed from the political sphere, the decision to resort to
third-party settlement is not, and third-party settlement may sometimes prove
impossible for this reason. Indeed, it is the very fact of taking control away
from the parties that makes them reluctant to agree to third-party settlement
in so many cases. Where the parties are willing to give up control and the
flexibility that goes with it, it is often because they wish to avoid political
accountability for a result that may turn out to be less favorable than they
might have hoped.
Paradoxically, third-party settlement can be as bad or worse than
negotiation in encouraging extreme claims and positions, especially where
the law is unsettled. This is because such claims and positions are addressed
I See Tom Kenworthy & Steven Pearlstein, U.S., CanadaReach Pact on Pacific
Salmon
Fishing,WASH. POST, June 4, 1999, at A17.
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to a third party who, it may be hoped, might conceivably take a "split-thedifference" approach or be swayed by considerations not likely to influence
the other party in a negotiation. On the latter point, I have in mind certain
arguments put forward by both Canada and the United States in the Gulf of
Maine case. 2 These were arguments based on unrelated and non-prejudicial
arrangements previously entered into by the two countries. Both parties tried
to exploit these arrangements to the prejudice of the other side. Happily, the
Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected these attempts.
The point is, however, that adversarial proceedings make it hard for lawyers
to leave anything out. In a negotiation, on the other hand, political factors
may sometimes impose a greater measure of discipline to avoid widening or
sharpening a dispute and needlessly affecting future relations between the
parties.
In the light of this sketchy review of the roles of law and diplomacy, I
now turn to the question of the IJC as a possible model. This will require an
examination of the nature, mandate, functions, and procedures of the

Commission.
Article VII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides for the
establishment and maintenance of a permanent International Joint
Commission composed of six Commissioners. Each government appoints
three Commissioners, thus assuring equality of membership. The
Commission is not an arm of government and Commissioners do not
represent, take instructions from, or report to the government that appointed
them. This independence is confirmed by Article XII of the treaty, which
requires Commissioners to make a solemn declaration in writing that they
will faithfully and impartially perform their duties under the treaty.4
Independence is further confirmed by the Commission's and the
Commissioners' immunity from judicial process in both countries. The
Commission's decisions - as distinct from its recommendations - are thus
not subject to appeal to the courts of either country. They can, in practice, be
reversed only by an agreement between the two countries.
Although the Commission is made up of two sections - one Canadian and
one American - it acts as a single, unitary body that is intended to work
collegially in the common interest of both countries. As will be seen in my
later discussion of its functions, the Commission is empowered to serve both
as a binational tribunal and as a binational commission of inquiry.
2

See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine (Canada v. United

States of America) 1984 I.CJ. 246 (Oct. 12).
3 Treaty Relating to Boundary waters between the United
States and Canada, Jan. 11,
1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2449 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
Ild. at art. VII.
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The very nature of the Commission as I have just described it is
responsible for some of its unique advantages. Because it is not a forum for
negotiation between the two governments, it avoids the shortcomings of that
process. Unlike the State Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Commission can and must examine matters impartially and pursue
solutions that rise above contending national interests. Its parity of
membership ensures equality. Its permanent character means that for the
specific classes of issues pre-assigned to it for final determination, the
Commission may proceed without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate
that would otherwise be required for a judicial proceeding. Its independence
and immunity insulate it from political pressures. And its binational makeup
helps it escape the effects of remoteness associated with third-party
settlement.
I turn now from the nature of the Commission to its mandate and
functions.
The fundamental mandate of the Commission, as reflected in the
preamble to the Boundary Waters Treaty, is to prevent and resolve disputes
between Canada and the United States.5 To discharge this mandate, the
Commission is assigned three key functions.
The first of these functions is a quasi-judicial one. Article Im of the treaty
empowers the Commission to rule upon applications for any new uses,
obstructions or diversions of boundary waters in either country that affect the
natural level or flow of waters in the other country. Article IV similarly
empowers the Commission to rule upon applications for the construction of
any works, dams, or other obstructions in rivers that flow from boundary
waters, or rivers that flow across the border, if these projects will raise the
natural level on the other side of the boundary in the upstream country.7 The
Commission's decisions on such applications are final and binding.
Moreover, the Commission may appoint a board of control to oversee and
assist in the implementation of an order of approval by which it has
authorized a project to proceed.
The second key function assigned to the Commission is an investigative
and advisory one. Article IX of the treaty mandates the Commission to
examine and report upon the facts and circumstances of transboundary issues
referred to it by either government, and to provide appropriate conclusions or
recommendations.8 These conclusions and recommendations, however, are
not binding as to facts or law, and final control is thus left with the two
5
6

7
8

Id. at preamble.
Id. at art. 11m.
Id. at art. IV.
Id. at art. IX.
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governments, who remain free to negotiate any solution upon which they can
agree with such assistance as they may find in the Commission's views.
The third key function assigned to the Commission is an arbitral one.
Article X provides that the Commission may decide any matter of difference
referred to it jointly by the two governments for this purpose.9 The advice
and consent of the U.S. Senate is required before the U.S. government can
submit to this legally binding process. No matter has ever been referred to
the Commission under this Article.
It is, of course, relevant to enquire whether the Commission applies rules
and principles of public international law when acting in either its quasijudicial or advisory capacity. The answer is that, for the purposes of the
Commission's mandate, the Boundary Waters Treaty establishes the
applicable international law for waters in the boundary region. In following
the requirements of the treaty, the Commission is applying the appropriate
rules of international law. When, for example, the Commission is asked to
approve a project in boundary waters or in a transboundary river, it must
apply the rules or principles that the governments of Canada and the United
States have set out in Article VIII of the treaty and that they have agreed will
govern such cases. The code found in this article leaves little if any room for
the application of other rules of international law.
There are, however, cases in which the Commission may have to consider
other requirements of international law. These arise most frequently under
Article IX references, when the Commission is asked to examine and provide
recommendations on issues of concern along the border. 0 In these situations,
governments normally want the Commission to examine all relevant factors
that could help in preventing or resolving disputes, although the governments
can focus or restrict the scope of the Commission's inquiry. The Commission
has just completed its final report on a reference with respect to the
protection of the waters of the Great Lakes. Although the governments did
not specifically ask the Commission in that reference to look at international
law issues, the Commission decided that it should examine whether the
requirements of international trade law prevent governments from protecting
the waters of the lakes. It found that they do not.
The procedures followed by the Commission in pursuing its functions are
similar in many ways in both quasi-judicial and advisory cases.
Decisions by the Commission call for the concurrence of at least four
Commissioners to ensure that decisions can be reached only if at least one
Commissioner from each country agrees. In practice, however, almost all
decisions are taken by consensus. This is a remarkable achievement. Equality
9

Id. at artX.

10 Id. at art IX.
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of membership, it might be thought, could all too easily lead to an equal
division of three against three. John Read, the only Canadian ever to have
served as a judge of the World Court, once declared, "from an abstract point
of view, it could be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, that [the
Commission] could not possibly work," given the lack of a neutral umpire. In
fact, over a period of almost ninety years, the Commission has divided along
national lines in only two cases out of 117 and has usually reached
unanimous agreement.
Another striking feature of the Commission's procedures is joint factfinding. In both quasi-judicial and advisory proceedings, the Commission
normally establishes a board to advise it on issues that arise with respect to
the matter at hand. These boards are composed of an equal number of
members from each country, who are often drawn from federal, provincial,
or state government agencies but may also come from the private sector.
Whatever their background, board members are expected to act in their
personal and professional capacity and not as representatives of their
government or their employer. Like the Commission itself, the boards seek to
work on the basis of consensus.
This method of dealing with factual issues is almost certainly more
reliable and more effective than any method normally available in a thirdparty settlement or negotiation. It is reinforced by the fact that Article XII of
the treaty empowers the Commission to compel the attendance of witnesses
and take evidence on oath.
Joint fact-finding is a most important element in building consensus not
only within the Commission itself but also within the communities that may
be affected by the Commission's decision or recommendations. Another
consensus-building measure lies in the provisions of Article XII of the treaty,
which require the Commission to give a "convenient opportunity to be
heard" to any party in any matter before the Commission." To this end, the
Commission holds public hearings where all who wish to do so may express
their views before the Commission reaches a decision or submits its
recommendations. In the same spirit of consensus building, the Commission
invites and facilitates the engagement of provincial, state, and municipal
governments in its consideration of transboundary issues of concern to them.
Again, these procedures represent advantages not offered by negotiation or
third-party settlement.
Over almost ninety years, the Commission has developed a rich body of
practice in addressing transboundary water and environmental issues

11Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 3, at art. XII.
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assigned to it under the Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, 12 and other agreements. For example:
A. In its 1931 report on the Trail Smelter reference, the Commission
provided the governments with recommendations for remedial measures
to reduce emissions from the smelter at Trail, British Columbia and
proposed a formula for the payment of compensation to cover damages
brought to
suffered in the United States. The advice that the Commission
3
conflict.1
serious
a
avert
to
helped
issue
this
on
bear
B. In 1944, the UC was asked to investigate the potential for greater use and
development of the Columbia River and, in 1959, to recommend
principles for the apportionment of downstream benefits, relating
particularly to power generation and flood control. The Commission's
response to these references helped the governments to conclude the 1961
Columbia River Development Treaty.14
C. In the Garrison Diversion and Flathead references of 1975 and 1985,
respectively, the Commission was asked to advise the governments
whether certain proposed projects - the first in the United States and the
second in Canada - would contravene the prohibition against
transboundary pollution in Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
The Commission recommended against the construction of both projects,
and neither has been built.
D. Most recently, the Commission completed a yearlong study of
consumptive uses, diversions, and exports of the waters of the Great
Lakes. On February 22 of this year, it submitted its report to the two
governments, with comprehensive recommendations for the protection of
these waters.
These few examples illustrate the complexity, importance, and
controversial nature of the issues with which the Commission must deal.
They illustrate also that the Commission's permanence, equality of
membership, independence, impartiality, and its binational but unitary nature
have all served it well. So have its procedures, most notably consensus
Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, 1978 Can. T.S. No. 20;
30 U.S.T.S. 1383.
13 Trail Smelter: United States v. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal,
Apr. 16, 1938 and
Mar. 11, 1941; U.N. REP. OF INT'L ARBrrRALAWARDS 3 (1947) 1905.
14 Columbia River Development Treaty.
12

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:47 2000]

building through joint fact finding, public participation, and the engagement
of local governments. Together, these features make the Commission truly
one of a kind as a system for the settlement of disputes.
This system works hesitantly at times, perhaps even painfully. To
everyone's satisfaction in every case, certainly not. But in most cases it
resolves disputes. And it is hard to quarrel with a long record of success.
The time has now come to address the question whether the Commission
can serve as a model for the resolution of disputes between Canada and the
United States. The relevance of the Commission as a potential model for
other countries is, of course, quite another matter but is not on our agenda
today.
If, then, the question were whether the Commission model can be
adopted holus-bolus as a permanent general mechanism for the resolution of
a broader range of Canada-U.S. disputes, the answer would appear to be a
definite no. The reasons for this conclusion are simple. First, one of the two
countries' most prolific sources of problems - international trade - is already
endowed with its own dispute-settlement systems under NAFTA and the
WTO. Second, the Commission itself, in any event, already has the general
jurisdiction to hear any and every dispute whatever that may be jointly
referred to it by Canada and the United States under the arbitral provisions in
Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty. As I pointed out earlier, that article
has never been invoked. Thus, it seems highly improbable, if not impossible,
that the two governments would ever agree to the establishment of a new
tribunal of general jurisdiction - especially compulsory jurisdiction. This
view is further borne out by the cold reception the governments accorded to
the scheme of compulsory third-party settlement proposed some twenty years
ago by the Canadian and American Bar Associations to deal with legal
disputes between Canada and the United States. In fact, if the International
Joint Commission itself did not exist today, the odds are that it could not be
invented.
The Commission, however, can serve as a model in less ambitious ways.
Its use of joint fact finding and consensus building procedures has proven to
be of great value in the resolution of disputes submitted to the Commission.
These procedures address one of the critical weaknesses inherent in both
negotiation and third party settlement. Although the Canadian and U.S.
governments have previously involved interest groups in negotiations of
concern to them, I do not believe that the experience has been a productive
one. The problem appears to be that these groups simply become part sometimes the driving part - of an adversarial process.
The boards appointed by the Commission to assist in both quasi-judicial
and advisory cases work in a very different way. Their members serve in a
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personal and professional capacity, not as representatives of any group. They
seek to establish the facts in an objective manner. They look for points of
agreement, not disagreement. All of this may sometimes be very difficult, but
it has worked more often than not. It is worth trying outside the Commission
framework as well.
Still, the best inspiration that might be drawn from the Commission
model is greater use of the Commission itself in its advisory capacity.
Although the two governments have certainly kept the Commission busy
over the past three years, Article IX offers ample room for further references
to the Commission on virtually any transboundary issue. I personally would
like to see the two governments call upon the Commission more often, and
on non-traditional issues.
The traditional issues referred to the Commission are, of course,
transboundary questions relating to water and the environment. The fact that
the Commission has specialized in these areas is one of the reasons for the
success it has enjoyed. Nevertheless, this should not discourage some
ventures into new areas. The Commission has demonstrated a good deal of
flexibility in adapting to new circumstances during its almost ninety years of
existence. Moreover, those many years have given it a certain momentum, a
built-up collegial will to succeed that should enable it to meet fresh
challenges in the 2 1S"century. After all, no one would wish to see the old ship
hit the rocks on his or her watch.

